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|[ Article ]|
|Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 351-378|
|ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print)|
|Print publication date 31 Aug 2001|
|Received 09 Jun 2001 Revised 16 Jan 2001|
|Models of Interconnection in Telecommunications|
Sang Taek Kim ; Hyeong-Chan Kim
|Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Ewha Womans University, 11-1, Daehyun-Dong, Sudaemun-Ku, Seoul 120-750, Korea, Tel: +82-2-3277-2772 (email@example.com)|
|Senior Research Fellow, KISDI, 1-1, Jooam-Dong, Kwachun-si, Kyunggi-Do 427-070, Korea, Tel: +82-2-570-4260 (firstname.lastname@example.org)|
Funding Information ▼
JEL Classification: L96, L98
We proposed and utilized a simple model to review relay interconnection literatures. Without any complications of scale economies and opportunity costs, marginal cost pricing of interconnection charge is optimal. When incumbent sets the interconnection charge, it may or may not foreclose entrants depending upon degree of entrant's efficiency and forms of interconnection charge. When there are opportunity costs for incumbent to interconnect, then opportunity cost should be paid by the entrant according to the efficient component pricing rule. When there are economies of scale, Ramsey pricing comes to rescue. In an extension of Ramsey spirit, the global price caps are suggested.
Next, we have reviewed the current status of the two-way access theory. First, a case of collusive retail prices has been presented even when the market competition exists between symmetric networks. In this case, the use of two-part tariffs or price discrimination can help, as they enable firms to compete in market shares without affecting their access payments. Various types of Internet interconnection are presented along with main results by Laffont, Marcus, Rey and Tirole (2001a, b) on the pricing issues of Internet interconnection.
|Keywords: Interconnection, Telecommunication, Networks
We are grateful to Dr. Youngsub Chun and Participants at International Symposium on Cost Allocation in Telecommunications sponsored by Institute of Economic Research of Seoul National University and Korea Information Society Development Institute. We are also grateful to Dr. Jongwha Lee of KISDI for valuable comments. We also wish to acknowledge the financial support of internal research funds from Ewha Womans University. This article reflects the views of the authors.
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