[ Article ]
Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 185-223
Abbreviation: SJE
ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print)
Print publication date 30 May 2019
Received 28 Feb 2019 Revised 07 Mar 2019 Accepted 08 Mar 2019
Information Transmission in Revision Games
Yves Guéron
Yves Guéron, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea, Tel: +82-2-880-6377 (ygueron@snu.ac.kr)
Funding Information ▼ National Research Foundation of Korea NRF-2014S1A5A8017310
JEL Classification: C70, C72, C73

Revision games model a situation in which players can prepare their actions during a pre-play phase. We introduce one-sided incomplete information in two coordination games, one of common interest and one of opposing interest, and study how the pre-play phase affects coordination. We find that in the common interest game, the unique Bayesian equilibrium is such that the informed player will signal the state of the world through her prepared action, unless the pre-play phase is about to finish, in which case she seeks to coordinate with the other player. In the opposing interest game, the equilibrium is similar when the informed player is the one receiving less opportunity to revise her actions. When it is the uninformed player who receives less revision opportunities, we show that it is possible no information is revealed if both players are initially coordinated, but some information must be revealed if they are initially miscoordinated.