Sorry.
You are not permitted to access the full text of articles.
If you have any questions about permissions,
please contact the Society.
์ฃ์กํฉ๋๋ค.
ํ์๋์ ๋ ผ๋ฌธ ์ด์ฉ ๊ถํ์ด ์์ต๋๋ค.
๊ถํ ๊ด๋ จ ๋ฌธ์๋ ํํ๋ก ๋ถํ ๋๋ฆฝ๋๋ค.
[ Article ] | |
Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 151-163 | |
Abbreviation: SJE | |
ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print) | |
Print publication date 30 May 2016 | |
Received 15 Dec 2015 Revised 05 Jan 2016 Accepted 25 Feb 2016 | |
Interdependent Value Auctions with an Insider Bidder | |
Jinwoo Kim
| |
Professor, Department of Economics, Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro Gwanak-gu, Seoul 151-742, South Korea, Tel: +82-2-880-6448, Fax: +82-2-886-4231 (jikim72@snu.ac.kr) | |
Funding Information ▼ | |
JEL Classification: C92, D44, D82 |
We study the efficiency of standard auctions with interdependent values in which one of two bidders is perfectly informed of his value while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as well as English auction, has a unique ex-post equilibrium that yields efficient allocation. By contrast, the first-price auction has no efficient equilibrium.
Keywords: Interdependent value, Insider, Second-price auction, First-price auction |
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2014S1A5A2A03065638).
1. | Bikhchandani, S., and J. Riley. “Equilibria in Open Common Value Auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory 53 (No. 1 1991): 101-30. |
2. | Campbell, C., and D. Levin. “Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?” Journal of Economic Theory 91 (No. 1 2000): 106-20. |
3. | Change, S.-J. “Monetary Allocation Mechanism under Asymmetric Information and Limited Communication.” Seoul Journal of Economics 3 (No. 1 1990): 33-71. |
4. | Choi, S., J.-A. Guerra, and J. Kim. “Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Information: Theory and Experiment.” Mimeograph, 2015. |
5. | Chung, K.-S., and J. Ely. “Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations,” Mimeograph, 2000. |
6. | Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., P. Milgrom, and R. Weber. “The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 10 (No. 1 1982): 105-14. |
7. | Hendricks, K., R. Porter, and C. Wilson. “Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price.” Econometrica 62 (No. 6 1994): 1414-44. |
8. | Kim, J. “The Value of an Informed Bidder in Common Value Auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory 143 (No. 1 2008): 585-95. |
9. | Kim, J., and Y.-K. Che. “Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions.” Games and Economic Behavior 46 (No. 2 2004): 383-97. |
10. | Lebrun, B. “First Price Auction in Asymmetric N Bidder Case.” International Economic Review 40 (No. 1 1999): 125-42. |
11. | Maskin, E. “Auctions and Privatization.” In H. Siebert (ed.), Privatization, Institute fur Weltwirschaften der Universät Kiel, Germany, pp. 115-36, 1992. |
12. | Maskin, E., and J. Riley. “Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions.” Review of Economic Studies 67 (No. 3 2000a): 439-54. |
13. | Maskin, E.. “Asymmetric Auctions.” Review of Economic Studies 67 (No. 3 2000b): 413-38. |
14. | Milgrom, P., and R. Weber. “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding.” Econometrica 50 (1982): 1089-122. |
Editorial Office, Seoul Journal of Economics, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University 599 Gwanangno, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 151-746, Korea
Tel: +82-2-880-5434 | Fax: +82-2-888-4454 | E-mail: sje@plaza.snu.ac.kr
Copyright (c) 2020 SJE. All rights reserved.