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|[ Article ]|
|Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 491-500|
|ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print)|
|Print publication date 30 Nov 2003|
|Received 18 Oct 2002 Revised 21 Jul 2004|
|Private Information and Endogenous Entry|
Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz ; Jesús Rubio
|Lecturer, Departamento de Fundamentos del Analisis Economico I, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain, Tel: +34-946013829, Fax: +34-946013891 (email@example.com)|
|Lecturer, Departamento de Economia Aplicada III, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain, Tel: +34- 946013826, Fax: 34+946013754 (firstname.lastname@example.org)|
Funding Information ▼
JEL Classification: L2, L22, D82
We assume an organization made up of a principal and an agent in which the agent privately observes the state of nature. The agent can use his private information to set up a new firm (endogenous entry) with a positive fixed cost. We show that, in equilibrium, there is effective endogenous entry if the cost of entry the agent must bear to establish a new firm is low enough, as the agent has better information about the state of nature than the principal.
|Keywords: Endogenous entry, Private information
We thank referees for helpful comments. Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnolog a and FEDER (BEC2003-04430), UPV (HB-8238/ 2000) and UPV (Subvencion a grupos, 2001) is gratefully acknowledged.
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