You are not permitted to access the full text of articles.
If you have any questions about permissions,
please contact the Society.
ํ์๋์ ๋ ผ๋ฌธ ์ด์ฉ ๊ถํ์ด ์์ต๋๋ค.
๊ถํ ๊ด๋ จ ๋ฌธ์๋ ํํ๋ก ๋ถํ ๋๋ฆฝ๋๋ค.
|[ Article ]|
|Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 245-267|
|ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print)|
|Print publication date 31 Aug 2001|
|Received 09 Jun 2001 Revised 22 Oct 2001|
|Three Solutions to a Simple Commons Problem|
|Professor, Department of Economics, Rice University, MS 22, P. O. Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251-1892, USA, Tel: +1-713-348-3532 (firstname.lastname@example.org)|
Funding Information ▼
JEL Classification : C71, D63, D78
We compare the equity and incentive properties of three efficient solutions to a simple problem of cooperative production with binary demands for a homogeneous service, when marginal cost is either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing.
The solutions are the familiar competitive equilibrium with equal incomes, the Shapley value of the stand alone cooperative game, and the virtual price solution, applying the egalitarian equivalence idea to this particular model.
|Keywords: Cooperative production, No-envy, Shapley value, Tragedy of the commons
This paper prepared for the SJE-KISDI, International Symposium on Cost Allocation in Telecommunications, Seoul National University, June 9, 2001, Seoul, Korea. Also support from the NSF under grant SES 0096230 is gratefully acknowledged.
|1.||Cres, H., and Moulin, H. Commons with Increasing Marginal Costs: Random Priority versus Average Cost. Mimeograph, Rice University, 1999.
|2.||Dasgupta, P., and Heal, G. Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
|3.||Demers, A, Keshav, S., and Shenker, S. “Analysis and Simulation of a Fair Queuing Algorithm.” International Research and Experience 1 (1990): 3-26.|
|4.||Feller, W. An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Volume 1. New York: Wiley, 1971.|
|5.||Hardin, G. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162 (1968): 1243-8.
|6.||Moulin, H. Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game Theoretic Introduction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
|7.||Moulin, H., and Shenker, S. “Serial Cost Sharing.” Econometrica 50 (1992): 1009-39.
|8.||Moulin, H. “Strategyproof of Sharing of Submodular Costs: Budget Balance versus Efficiency.” Forthcoming in Economic Theory, 1999.|
|9.||Ostrom, E. Governing the Commons. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.|
|10.||Shapley, L. S. “A Value for N-Person Games.” In H. W. Kuhn and W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Game II, Annals of Mathematical Studies, 28. Pricenton, NJ: Priceton University Press, 1953.
|11.||Shenker, S. “Making Greed Work in Networks: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Gateway Service Disciplines.” Mimeograph, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, 1990.
|12.||Thomson, W., and Varian, H. “Theories of Justice Bases on Symmetry.” In Hurwicz et al. (eds.), Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1985.|
|13.||Young, H. P. Equity: In Theory and Practice. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.|
Editorial Office, Seoul Journal of Economics, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University 599 Gwanangno, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 151-746, Korea
Tel: +82-2-880-5434 | Fax: +82-2-888-4454 | E-mail: email@example.com
Copyright (c) 2020 SJE. All rights reserved.