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|[ Article ]|
|Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 253-278|
|ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print)|
|Print publication date 31 Aug 2000|
|Received Aug 2000 Revised Oct 2000|
|Japanese Corporate Governance in Transition|
|St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX2 6JF, UK (firstname.lastname@example.org)|
JEL Classification: G21, G32
Japanese corporate governance is in transition. Such an institutional change can be an evolutionary and path- dependence process, since it may not necessarily follow the same paths taken in other countries, nor converge to existing models elsewhere. The paper deals with (1) a stylised model of Japanese corporate governance, (2) the current problems of existing mechanisms and some emerging new disciplines and players, and (3) some implications for the future of Japanese corporate governance. Throughout the paper, the two-tier and contingent mechanism will be stressed not only as a traditional Japanese model but also a more general model of corporate governance.
|Keywords: Japanese corporate governance, Main bank system, Contingent mechanism
I would like to thank Sung Wook Joh, Beate Reszat, Yishay Yafeh and other participants for their helpful comments at the conferences on “Corporate Governance and Restructuring in East Asia” (Seoul National University, August 25, 2000), CEPR European Network on the Japanese Economy (Oxford, July 30-31, 1999), and “The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Europe and Japan” (Robert Schuman Center, European University Institute, June 10-11, 1999). The views expressed in this paper are my own and should not be held to represent those of institutes that I belong to.
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