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[ Article ] | |
Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 21-35 | |
Abbreviation: SJE | |
ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print) | |
Print publication date 29 Feb 2000 | |
Received Dec 1999 Revised Mar 2000 | |
Incentive Delegation and Collusion | |
Arijit Mukherjee
| |
Post-doctoral Researcher, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, Faculteit Technologie Management, Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, the Netherlands, Tel: +31-40-247-2924, Fax: +31-40-247-4646 (A.Mukherjee@tm.tue.nl) | |
Funding Information ▼ | |
JEL Classification: D21, L13, L20 |
In an infinitely repeated duopoly we show the implications of strategic incentive delegation. Whether incentive delegation makes consumers or producers better-off depends on the nature of competition. We explain that the presence or absence of incentive delegation may affect the interests of the consumers and the producers in a similar way.
I would like to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for their valuable comments and suggestions. I acknowledge the financial support from the Netherlands Technology Foundation (STW).
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