Seoul Journal of Economics
[ Article ]
Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 37, No. 1, pp.55-73
ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print)
Print publication date 28 Feb 2024
Received 29 Jan 2024 Accepted 29 Jan 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22904/sje.2024.37.1.003

Killer Acquisitions

Yves Guéron
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea ygueron@snu.ac.kr

JEL Classification: K21, L41, L13

Abstract

Killer-Acquisitions – acquisitions in which an acquirer abandons the product development of a target firm after having acquired it – have been a growing concern of policy makers, especially given the high mergers and acquisitions activity of Big Tech. This paper offers a survey on the recent literature on startup acquisition, and what criterions antitrust authorities should pay attention to when evaluating a merger between an incumbent and a startup.

Keywords:

Innovation, Mergers, Killer acquisitions, Startups, Entry deterrence

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to my co-author Jihong Lee, as this survey is inspired by our joint work. I am also thankful to all the participant of the 30th SJE Symposium on Recent Issues in Anti-trust Economics.

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