Seoul Journal of Economics
[ Article ]
Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 13, No. 2, pp.165-183
ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print)
Print publication date 31 May 2000
Received Jul 2000 Revised Oct 2000

Credit Rationing with a Moral Hazard Problem

Jeeman Jung
Assistant Professor of Economics, Sangmyung University, Seoul 110-743, Korea, Tel: +82-2-2287-5189, Fax: +82-2-396-5702 jmjung@pine.sangmyung.ac.kr

JEL Classification: G21, G32

Abstract

This paper examines an alternative model of credit rationing when moral hazard is present in the credit market. Two regimes are considered: one with a continuous trading assumption and the other with a restriction on trading. Continuous trading enables one to construct a riskless hedging portfolio and therefore leads to market failure. Under restrictions on trading, however, the entrepreneur of a firm does not undertake an extremely risky activity and the optimal strategy depends on the amount of debt: the larger the amount of debt, relative to the value of a firm's assets, the greater the entrepreneur's incentive to follow a risky strategy. In this situation, credit rationing is beneficial to lenders.

Keywords:

Moral hazard, Credit rationing, Continuous trading

Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge the financial support of the Sangmyung University.

References

  • Aitchison, J., and Brown, J. A. C. The Lognormal Distribution with Special Reference to Its Uses in Economics. London: Cambridge University Press, 1957.
  • Asquith, Paul, and Mullins, David W., Jr. “Equity Issues and Offering Dilution.” Journal of Financial Economics 15 (Nos. 1-2 1986): 61-89. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(86)90050-4]
  • Bernanke, Ben S., and Gertler, Mark. “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations.” American Economic Review 79 (No. 1 1989): 14-31.
  • Bester, Helmut. “Screening versus Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information.” American Economic Review 75 (No. 4 1985): 850-5.
  • Black, Fischer, and Scholes, Myron. “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities.” Journal of Political Economy 81 (No. 3 1973): 637-54. [https://doi.org/10.1086/260062]
  • Freimer, Marshall, and Gordon, Myron. “Why Bankers Ration Credit?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 79 (1965): 397-416. [https://doi.org/10.2307/1882705]
  • Gale, Douglas, and Hellwig, Martin. “Incentive-Compatible Debt Contract: The One Period Problem.” Review of Economic Studies 52 (No. 4 1985): 647-64. [https://doi.org/10.2307/2297737]
  • Greenwald, Bruce, and Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Imperfect Information, Finance Constraints, and Business Fluctuations.” Discussion Paper No. 15. Princeton University, 1988.
  • Hellwig, Martin. “Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection.” European Economic Review 31 (Nos. 1-2 1987): 319-25. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(87)90046-8]
  • Hodgman, Donald R. “Credit Risk and Credit Rationing.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 74 (1960): 258-78. [https://doi.org/10.2307/1884253]
  • Jaffee, Dwight M. Credit Rationing and the Commercial Loan Market: An Econometric Study of the Structure of the Commercial Loan Market. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971.
  • Jaffee, Dwight M., and Modigliani, Franco. “A Theory and Test of Credit Rationing.” American Economic Review 59 (No. 5 1969): 850-72.
  • Jaffee, Dwight M., and Russell, Thomas. “Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (No. 4 1976): 651-66. [https://doi.org/10.2307/1885327]
  • Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (No. 4 1976): 305-60. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X]
  • Keynes, John Maynard. A Treatise on Money. England: MacMillan St. Martin's Press, 1930.
  • Merton, Robert C. “On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: TheRisk Structure of Interest Rates.” Journal of Finance 29 (1974): 449-70. [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x]
  • Myers, Stewart C., and Majluf, Nicholas S. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have.” Journal of Financial Economics 13 (1984): 187-222. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0]
  • Roosa, Robert. “Interest Rates and the Central Bank.” In Money, Trade, and Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of John H. Williams. New York: MacMillan, 1951: 270-95.
  • Shiller, Robert J. “Speculative Prices and Popular Models.” Unpublished Manuscript, Yale University, 1988.
  • Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Weiss, Andrew. “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.” American Economic Review 71 (No. 3 1981): 393-410.
  • Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Weiss, Andrew. “Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets.” American Economic Review 73 (No. 5 1983): 912-27.