Seoul Journal of Economics
[ Article ]
Seoul Journal of Economics - Vol. 18, No. 4, pp.325-354
ISSN: 1225-0279 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Nov 2005
Received 02 May 2005 Revised 26 Oct 2005

R&D and Merger Profitability

Gamal Atallah
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, P.O. Box 450, STN. A., Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada, Tel: +1-613-562-5800 (ext. 1695), Fax: +1-613-562-5999 gatallah@ uottawa.ca

JEL Classification: D43, L13, O33

Abstract

This paper analyzes the interaction between R&D and merger profitability. The industry is composed of symmetric firms who undertake cost-reducing R&D and compete in output. A subgroup of firms merge, and all firms adjust their R&D investments to the new market structure. It is found that in most cases R&D has a negligible impact on merger profitability, and does not change the critical number of firms required to make a merger profitable. However, when firms are indifferent toward a merger in the absence of R&D, R&D has an effect on merger profitability. Noncooperative R&D makes such mergers profitable for low and high levels of spillovers, and unprofitable for intermediate levels of spillovers; moreover, the range of spillovers such that a merger is unprofitable due to R&D increases with concentration. Cooperative R&D without information sharing makes such mergers profitable for low spillovers, but unprofitable for high spillovers. Cooperative R&D with information sharing makes such mergers unprofitable.

Keywords:

Mergers, Merger paradox, R&D, R&D cooperation, R&D spillovers

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank anonymous referees for useful comments.

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